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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
Is the decision of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals,
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
retaining jurisdiction over the issue of custody of the parties'
minor children despite the fact that the mother has moved from
this state with the children, in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court.
II.
Has the Utah Court of Appeals, in holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over
the issue of the custody of the parties' minor children despite
the fact that the mother has moved from this state with the
children, decided an important question of municipal, state or
federal law which the Supreme Court should but has not decided.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
In a decision dated April 15, 1988 the panel of the Utah
Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the order of the trial court
denying Plaintiff's petition to transfer jurisdiction to
Washington State under the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act.
JURISDICTION
The Utah State Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2 (3)(a).

1

Respondent filed a motion for an extension of time to file a
brief in reply the petition for writ of certiorari.

An order

dated July 22, 1988 granted an extension of time to August 16,
1988.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The controlling provisions, Utah Code Annotated, Sections
78-45C-1 et. seq. and Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5, are set
forth in the appendix hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Wendy Rawlings (Rawlings) appealed from the
district court's modification of her divorce decree, claiming the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the decree because of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), in effect in
both Utah and Washington.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the

decision of the trial court.

Plaintiff now seeks a writ of

certiorari in the Supreme Court.
Defendant Mark Weiner (Weiner) and Rawlings were married
August 16, 1974, in Manti, Utah.
issue of their marriage.

The parties had five children as

The parties were divorced on May 18,

1982, by the Honorable Omer J. Call of the First District Court of
Box Elder County, Utah.

The original decree was later amended on

September 27, 1982, by Judge Call.

Rawlings was awarded custody

of the parties1 five children while Weiner was awarded carefully
enunciated visitation rights with the minor children.
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In December

1982, Rawlings remarried.
From 1982 to 1984 Weiner initiated several proceedings to
enforce the visitation order in the divorce decree, and each time
the judge ordered the parties to comply with the order.
In June 1984, Rawlings sent a letter to Weiner informing him
that she and the children had moved to "the Des Moines area" and
could be reached at a Utah post office box.
Washington in June of 1984.

Rawlings moved to

During the summer of 1984, Weiner

initiated several additional proceedings in an attempt to locate
his children.
In October 1984, another hearing was held and the court found
that Rawlings1 move constituted a substantial change in
circumstances allowing modification of the visitation provisions
in the divorce decree.
In April 1985, a shelter care hearing was held in Washington,
pursuant to emergency jurisdiction provided for in the Washington
UCCJA, to determine allegations of child abuse made by Rawlings
against Weiner.

Commissioner Gaddis of the Washington court noted

that the Washington court orders were temporary and any permanent
adjudication or realignment of the parties had to come from Utah,
until the Utah court declined jurisdiction.
In October 1985, Weiner filed an order to show cause in Utah.
In November 1985, Rawlings petitioned for transfer of jurisdiction
from Utah to Washington.

Pursuant to Rawlings1 transfer request,
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Commissioner Gaddis contacted the court in Utah and after
discussion with Judge Call declined to accept jurisdiction in
Washington.

Commissioner Gaddis urged the Utah court to retain

jurisdiction to enforce or modify custody and visitation orders.
On December 23, 1985, Judge Call filed a statement and order
and certified the matters of disqualification and jurisdiction to
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen of the First District Court of Utah for
determination.

Judge Christoffersen denied Rawlings' motion to

disqualify Judge Call, denied the Motion to Change Jurisdiction,
and set a hearing date in May 1986, for the order to show cause.
On October 21, 1986, the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order on the order to show cause were entered by the court.

The

court found Rawlings in contempt for continuing to use ""Rawlings"
as the children's last name after being ordered not to do so,
modified the visitation order and ordered that the parties have
joint custody of the children, with Rawlings maintaining physical
custody.
Weiner timely appealed the October 21, 1986 order.

Rawlings

cross-appealed on grounds that the First District Court lacked
jurisdiction.

Weiner 1 s appeal was dismissed for lack of

prosecution by order the Court of Appeals on June 9, 1987.

The

panel of the Utah Court of Appeals issued a unanimous decision,
dated April 15, 1988, affirming the decision of the trial court.
Plaintiff now seeks a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE DECISION OF THE PANEL OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT
IN CONFLICT WITH A DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Petitioner asserts that the decision of the panel of the Utah
Court of Appeals is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme
Court, specifically Trent v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987); and
that the decision is also contrary to the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-45C-1 et.seq.
Petitioner claims that Trent is applicable only to cases involving
visitation rights and not to cases involving issues of custody.
Petitioner asserts that had Trent involved a situation where the
father was seeking to gain custody of his children, the court
would have ruled differently.

While this may or may not be the

case, it does not place the holding of the Court of Appeals in
conflict with this Court's holding in Trent.

The holding in Trent

is that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to relinquish jurisdiction over the the father's action under the
particular facts of that case which included that the father was
only seeking to enforce visitation.

In this case Weiner filed an

action seeking custody of the children; however unlike Trent the
parties' children were born and lived in Utah prior to being taken
from the State by Rawlings in June of 1984.

In addition the Utah

Court had exercised it jurisdiction over the matter on several
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occasions following the entry of the initial decree, including to
modify the decree with respect to visitation after Rawlings had
moved from the State.

And finally in this case Washington State

had already declined to accept permanent jurisdiction of the
matter.

In Trent there is no indication that Idaho had made any

determination at all or even that an action had been filed there.
Although Trent may have dealt exclusively with an issue of
visitation it is clear from a reading of the case that the
decision to retain jurisdiction is one in which the trial court
has discretion and that absent an abuse of that discretion that
decision will not be overturned.

See also Harding v. Harding, 26

Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 308 (1971).
of the May 1986 hearing.

In this case there is no record

Absent such a record it must be presumed

that the trial court which heard the evidence acted correctly.
Fackrell y^ Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987).

The mere fact

that this case involved an issue of custody does not place it in
conflict with this Court's decision in Trent.
The decision of the panel of the Court of Appeals is also not
in conflict with the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act.

As noted by the decision of the Court of

Appeals, the UCCJA does not mandate the loss of jurisdiction to
the original state in all cases; but only if Utah chooses to
relinquish jurisdiction based upon the best interests of the
child, Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45C-3(l).
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The UCCJA does

also not require that the child be physically present in this
state in order to determine his custody. Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78~45C-3(3).

Petitioner argues that because the children

live outside the state the purposes of the UCCJA are contravened
by the decision to retain jurisdiction in this state; and yet
Petitioner does not offer any proof that best interests of the
child would be better served by relinquishing jurisdiction to the
State of Washington.

Absent such a showing, the decision of the

trial court and the action of the panel of the Court of Appeals in
affirming that decision must be presumed correct.

It is also

important to note that Judge Call and the Commissioner from the
Court in Washington State conferred on the decision as to which
court should exercise jurisdiction as prescribed by Utah Code
Annotated, Section 78-45C-7(4).

Based upon this conference the

Washington Court declined to accept jurisdiction.

Pursuant to

Utah Code Annotated, Section 78~45C-3(3)(d)(i) Utah should retain
jurisdiction if in is in the best interests of the child.

Again

it is clear that Petitioner's argument is not that the trial court
did not follow the UCCJA; but rather that Petitioner disagrees
with the court's decision that the best interests of the children
would be served if Utah retained jurisdiction.

And again it is

noted that Petitioner offers no proof that the trial court abused
the discretion which it is allowed in making that decision.
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POINT II.
THE HOLDING OF THE PANEL OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS
DECIDED AN ISSUE OF STATE LAW WHICH IS NO DOUBT IMPORTANT; BUT NOT
ONE WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOT ALREADY DECIDED.
There is no doubt that the First District Court has
jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce which it entered on
May 18, 1982.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(3) confers this

continuing jurisdiction.

The provisions of the UCCJA do not

strip this jurisdiction simply because the mother has moved from
this state, taking the children with her*

The UCCJA provides a

procedure for the court to follow in determining whether or not to
relinquish this jurisdiction in favor of another state.

Judge

Call followed this procedure and determined that Washington State
had declined to accept jurisdiction and that it was in the best
interests of the children that jurisdiction continue to be
exercised in Utah.

The holding of this court in Trent, supra, is

that the trial court is vested with the discretion to determine
whether or not to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of another
state; and that that decision will not be overturned unless that
discretion has been abused.

Petitioner has offered no evidence

that Judge Call abused his discretion in making that decision.

It

seems clear that the decision in Trent decided the important issue
of state law; and that this decision need not be made again by
this Court.

What Petitioner seeks is that this Court add its

8

review to the review of the Court of Appeals.

This is simply not

what is contemplated by Rule 43 # Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.
DATED this

fa

& day of August, 1988.

/,*?/

Michael L. Miller
Attorney for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact copies of
the foregoing to the attorney for the Petitioner, postage prepaid,
at:
Stephen W. Jewell, Esq.
15 South Main, Third Floor
Logan, Utah 84321
DATED this

//„ & day of August, 1988.

/&/

Carol M. Jones
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APR 18 1988
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

Wendy Marie Christensen Rawlings,
Plaintiff, Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Mark Douglas Weiner,

Case No. 860274-CA

Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent.
Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Bench.—
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DAVIDSON, J u d g e :

-eierk of me Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Plaintiff Wendy Rawlings (Rawlings) appeals from the
district court's modification of her divorce decree, claiming
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the decree
because of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),
in effect in both Utah and Washington. We affirm.
Defendant Mark Weiner (Weiner) and Rawlings were married
August 16, 1974, in Manti, Utah. The parties had five children
as issue of their marriage. The parties were divorced on May
18, 1982, by the Honorable Omer J. Call of the First District
Court of Box Elder County, Utah. The original decree was later
amended on September 27, 1982, by Judge Call. Rawlings was
awarded custody of the parties' five children while Weiner was
awarded carefully enunciated visitation rights with the minor
children. In December 1982, Rawlings remarried.
From 1982 to 1984 Weiner initiated several proceedings to
enforce the visitation order in the divorce decree, and each 1
time the judge ordered the parties to comply with the order.
1. All hearings were before Judge Call. The orders on the
order to show cause enumerated here dealt exclusively with
compliance of visitation rights. The orders by Judge Call were:
November 17, 1982; May 16, 1983; February 16, 1984; May 29, 1984

In June 1984, Rawlings sent a letter to Weiner informing
him that she and the children had moved to Hthe Des Moines area"
and could be reached at a Utah post office box. Rawlings moved
to Washington in June of 1984.2 During the summer of 1984,
Weiner initiated several additional proceedings in an attempt to
locate his children.3
In October 1984, another hearing was held and the court
found that Rawlings1 move constituted a substantial change in
circumstances allowing modification of the visitation provisions
in the divorce decree.
In April 1985, a shelter care hearing was held in
Washington, pursuant to emergency jurisdiction provided for in
the Washington UCCJA, to determine allegations of child abuse
made by Rawlings against Weiner. Commissioner Gaddis of the
Washington court noted that the Washington court orders were
temporary and any permanent adjudication or realignment of the
parties had to come from Utah, until the Utah court declined
jurisdiction.
In October 1985, Weiner filed an order to show cause in
Utah. In November 1985, Rawlings petitioned for transfer of
jurisdiction from Utah to Washington. Pursuant to Rawlings*
transfer request, Commissioner Gaddis contacted the court in
Utah and after discussion with Judge Call declined to accept
jurisdiction in Washington. Commissioner Gaddis urged the Utah
court to retain jurisdiction to enforce or modify custody and
visitation orders.
On December 23, 1985, Judge Call filed a statement and
order and certified the matters of disqualification and
jurisdiction to Judge VeNoy Christoffersen of the First District
Court of Utah for determination. Judge Christoffersen denied
Rawlings1 motion to disqualify Judge Call, denied the Motion to
Change Jurisdiction, and set a hearing date in May 1986, for the
order to show cause. On October 21, 1986, the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order on the order to show cause were
entered by the court. The court found Rawlings in contempt for
continuing to use "Rawlings" as the children's last name after
being ordered not to do so, modified the visitation order and
ordered that the parties have joint custody of the children,
with Rawlings maintaining physical custody.
2. The "Des Moines areaM referred to in the letter turned out
to be a suburb of Seattle, Washington.
3. Weiner1s continued attempt to locate his children resulted
in additional orders by Judge Call on July 26, 1984 and August
8, 1984.
860274-CA
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Weiner timely appealed the October 21/ 1986 order.
Rawlings cross-appealed on grounds that the First District Court
lacked jurisdiction. Weiner1s appeal was dismissed for lack of
prosecution by order of this Court on June 9, 1987.
Before addressing the issue of jurisdiction it is important
to note that there is no transcript of the May 1986 hearing.
Rawlings refers to continuing objections to jurisdiction made at
the May hearing. There is no record of these objections as
Rawlings requested no transcript. As held in Fackrell v.
Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987):
Appellate review of factual matters can be
meaningful, orderly, and intelligent only
in juxtaposition to a record by which
lower courts* rulings and decisions on
disputes can be measured. In this case
without a transcript no such record wag
available, and therefore no measurement of
the district court's action can be made as
urged upon us by defendant.
Id. at 1319-20 (quoting Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607, 608-09
(Utah 1976)). Without "adequate citations to the record, the
judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct."
Fackrell, 740 P.2d at 1319.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1987) provides:
The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders for
the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and
their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the
property as is reasonable and necessary.
This statute establishes continuing jurisdiction in the First
District Court of Box Elder County as the court granting the
decree of divorce. Rawlings argues that notwithstanding the
continuing jurisdiction, under the Utah UCCJA, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-45C-1 to 26 (1987), this state is an inconvenient forum.
Section 78-45c-3(l) states:
A court of this state which is competent
to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification
decree if the conditions as set forth in
any of the following paragraphs are met:
860274-CA
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(a)

This state (i) is the home state of
the chijld at the time of commencement
of the proceeding, or (ii) had been
the child's home state within six
months before commencement of the
proceeding and the child is absent
from this state because of his
removal or retention by a person
claiming his custody or for other
reasons, and a parent or person
acting as parent continues to live in
this state;

(b)

It is in the best interest of the
child that a court of this state
assume jurisdiction because (i) the
child and his parents, or the child
and at least one contestant, have a
significant connection with this
state, and (ii) there is available in
this state substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training,
and personal relationships;

(c)

The child is physically present in
this state and (i) the child has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in
an emergency to protect the child
because he has been subjected to or
threatened with mistreatment or abuse
or is otherwise neglected or
dependent; or

(d)

(i) It appears that no other state
would have jurisdiction under
prerequisites substantially in
accordance with Paragraphs (a), (b),
or (c), or another state has declined
to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that this state is the more
appropriate forum to determine the
custody of the child, and (ii) it is
in the best interest of the child
that this court assume jurisdiction.

Section 78-45c-3(3) states:
Physical presence of the child, while
desirable, is not a prerequisite for
jurisdiction to determine his custody.
860274-CA
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Section 78-45c-7(3) states:
In determining if it is an
inconvenient forum, the court shall
consider if it is in the interest of
the child that another state assume
jurisdiction. For this purpose it
may take into account the following
factors, among others:
(a)

if another state is or recently was
the child's home state;

(b)

if another state has a closer
connection with the child and his
family or with the child and one or
more of the contestants;

(c)

if substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal
relationships is more readily
available in another state;

(d)

if the parties have agreed on another
forum which is no less appropriate;
and

(e)

if the exercise of jurisdiction by a
court of this state would contravene
any of the purposes stated in
§ 78-45C-1.

The UCCJA does not mandate loss of jurisdiction to the
original state in all cases. Only if Utah chooses to
relinquish jurisdiction, based on the best interests of the
children, will such jurisdiction transfer.4 In Trent v.
Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's authority under the Utah UCCJA in
declining to relinquish jurisdiction to Idaho. In Trent the
4. It may be argued that jurisdiction may be obtained through
the emergency provision in section 78-45c-3(l)(c) as was done in
this case. However, accepting such jurisdiction on an emergency
basis does not give permanent jurisdiction. The court is still
required to contact the original state court to determine which
court is most convenient and best serves the interests of the
children and the parties.

860274-CA
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children had neither lived in nor had any contacts with the
State of Utah, unlike the children in this case. While Trent
dealt exclusively with enforcement of visitation, it makes
clear that the UCCJA is not mandatory.
The facts show that Washington specifically declined to
exercise jurisdiction because of Utah's past and present
involvement with the matter. The judge in Utah and
commissioner in Washington conferred and determined that Utah
was the more appropriate forum and that Utah would continue to
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and
visitation of the parties' children. This is precisely the
position described in section 78-45c-3(l)(d)(i).5 We hold
that the First District Court appropriately retained
jurisdiction under the Utah UCCJA to make any determinations
regarding custody, visitation or other matters relevant to the
children.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

BENCH, Judge:

(Concurring)

For me, the instant case presents a very narrow question:
How does a state's continuing jurisdiction in a divorce case
mesh with foreign jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979)? I believe the

5. Section 78-45c-3(l)(d)(i) is the same version as used by
Judge Call in December 1985.

860274-CA
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question is answered by section 14(1) of UCCJA,1 which was
not mentioned by the majority but provides as follows:
If a court of another state has made
a custody decree, a court of this state
shall not modify that decree unless (a) it
appears to the court of this state that
the court which rendered the decree does
not now have jurisdiction under
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially
in accordance with this act or has
declined to assume jurisdiction to modify
the decree and (b) the court of this state
has jurisdiction.
The Commissioner's note to section 14 explains the
circumstances under which jurisdiction would shift:
Courts which render a custody decree
normally retain continuing jurisdiction to
modify the decree under local law. Courts
in other states have in the past often
assumed jurisdiction to modify the
out-of-state decree themselves without
regard to the preexisting jurisdiction of
the other state. In order to achieve
greater stability of custody arrangements
and avoid forum shopping, subsection (a)
declares that other states will defer to
the continuing jurisdiction of the court
of another state as long as that state has
jurisdiction under the standards of this
Act. In other words, all petitions for
modification are to be addressed to the
prior state if that state has sufficient
contact with the case to satisfy section
3. The fact that the court had previously
considered the case may be one factor
favoring its continued jurisdiction. If,
however, all the persons involved have
moved away or the contact with the state
has otherwise become slight, modification
jurisdiction would shift elsewhere.
1. In Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987); in
Washington, RCWA 26.27.140 (1986).

860274-CA
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9 U.L.A. at 154 (citation omitted).
The Reporter for the Special Committee preparing the UCCJA
was even more specific when she noted the following:
A typical example is the case of the
couple who are divorced in state A, their
matrimonial home state, and whose children
are awarded to the wife, subject to
visitation rights of the husband. Wife
and children move to state B, with or
without permission of the court to remove
the children. State A has continuing
jurisdiction and the courts in state B may
not hear the wife's petition to make her
the sole custodian, eliminate visitation
rights, or make any other modification of
the decree, even though state B has in the
meantime become the "home stateM under
section 3. The jurisdiction of state A
continues and is exclusive as long as the
husband lives in state A unless he loses
contact with the children, for example, by
not using his visitation privileges for
three years.
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A
Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws,
22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207, 1237 (1969) (quoted in State ex rel.
Cooper v, Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821, 826 (Tenn. 1985)).
Under the facts of this case, Utah's jurisdiction over
custody issues was primary and Washington's jurisdiction was
secondary. The parties were divorced in Utah. Rawlings
subsequently moved to Washington, taking the children with
her. Weiner remained in Utah, and continually sought
enforcement of his visitation rights under the Utah decree. At
Rawlings* request, Washington took emergency jurisdiction under
UCCJA. On discovering that Utah had continuing jurisdiction
over custody, Washington declined any further jurisdiction
under section 14(1). That was precisely what should have
happened under UCCJA. Because Utah had primary jurisdiction
over custody of the children, I concur in affirming the
judgment of the trial court.

Russell W. Bench, JiSjge^5^7^-^

860274-CA
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Stephen W. Jewell 3814
Attorney for Plaintiff
First Security Bldg., Third Floor
15 South Main
Logan, Utah
84321

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN
RAWLINGS,

ORDER ON ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 16868

vs.
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
Defendant,

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on May 21, 22, and 26, 1986, the Honorable Omer J. Call
presiding.

The Plaintiff appeared personally and by and

through her attorney, Stephen W. Jewell.
appeared personally.

The Defendant

The Court having heard sworn testimony

and evidence and having reviewed the pleadings on file herein
and the Exhibits presented, including the information from the
Washington Shelter Care proceedings, and having heard the
arguments of Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant, and having
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law,

and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the

following:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows::
M
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1.

Plaintiff shall be and is hereby held in contempt of

Court for failing to comply with the previous order of the
Court to discontinue the use of the Rawlings name for the
children.
2.

The name of the children is Werner and there shall

be no use by the Plaintiff of the Rawlings' name as the last
name of the children, either for sc,hool records, .medical
records,

3.

or o t h e r w i s e .

/^^aUai^^
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The reports of Bx-»-^aiXiQt.t CUTT^T" ^r^ij
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Dr. Jack

Reiter shall be presented to all current mental health care
providers for their review and consideration.
4.

Counseling and therapy as ordered by this Court and

by the Washington Court shall be resumed with Dr. Marilyn
Eshelman or such other qualified mental health care provider
as determined by Plaintiff and therapy shall be continued with
Dr. Tom Fairbank for Defendant.

The Court specifically orders

that once said mental health care provider is selected by
Plaintiff, there shall be no change of therapists without an
order of the Court.

Therapy will continue until terminated by

the Court on the recommendation of the therapists.

Should the

therapist become unavailable or desire to terminate the
relationship, Plaintiff shall immediately thereafter petition
the Court for removal thereof and appointment of another
mental health therapist.
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5.

All mail sent by Defendant or Plaintiff to the

children shall be received by Plaintiff or Defendant and
deliveredAto the children, whether said mail is sent first
class or registered.
6.

Each party shall provide the other party and the

Court with a current and regularly updated home phone number
and address.

During visitation, Defendant shall reasonably

inform Plaintiff of the whereabouts of the children and shall
provide an address and telephone number where the children can
be reached.
7.

There shall be no monitoring of telephone calls or

other recording of conversations or video tapingAi <8.

It is the order of the Court that telephone

conversations need be no longer than ten (10) to twenty

.

.

+
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Legal custody of the minor children of the parties

shall be jointly vested in each of the parties, with Plaintiff
being granted primary physical custody of the children with
visitation to Defendant as herein provided.
10.

Defendant shall be granted visitation with the

children as follows, recognizing that visitation is for the
chidren, and their needs are of primary importance in
determining visitation arrangements:
A.

During the children's school summer vacation,
Defendant shall be entitled to six (6) continuous

-A2 3-
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minutes long.
9.

(20)

14$

weeks.
For 1986 said visitation shall begin^on
June 22 for six (6) weeks, on June 29 for six
(6) weeks, on July 6 for six (6) weeks, or on
July 13 for six (6) weeks at the discretion of
Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall notify the Defendant
June 1, 1986, by registered mail, when said
visitation shall begin, and on each year
thereafter on or before June 1.
Said
visitation to be scheduled in future years
shall substantially comply with the order
as as stated above.
Said six, (6) weeks
visitation shall begin ^fmri-^n/ yat 5:00 p.m.,
and continue for six (6) weeks to the sixth
SfH^y. at 5:00 p.m.
During said six (6) week visitation, Plaintiff
shall be granted at least weekly telephone
conversations with each of the children and
shall be allowed visitation for at leas* two
(2) weekends, beginning Friday at 5:00 p.m.,
to Sunday at 5:00 p.m.
Plaintiff shall notify
Defendant of the visitation schedule or. or
before June 1, 1986, and subsequent years, by
registered mail.
Said visitation may be
exercised by Plaintiff u^_J^u-^^u^x-vii LL>, ^*gf!T*u^Ll
and the children
shall be picked up and returned to
^SS^f with no other restrictions except as
stated herein.
Defendant shall be allowed further visitation
of four to five (4 to 5) days during the
children's school Easter vacation in the
spring and three to four (3 to 4) days during
October or November as is allowed by the
children's school vacation as scheduled, not
to include Thanksgiving.
Plaintiff shall notify
Defendant of the dates and times such visitation
shall take place by registered mail at least
sixty (60) days prior to said visitation, or
when the school schedule is available.
Said
visitation shall m no way interfere with
regularly scheduled school.
Thanksgiving and Christmas visitation shall
continue as provided in previous orders of the
Court.
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11.

Travel expenses for all visitation,

including

picking up the children in Washington and returning them to
Washington for the summer visitation, shall be the
responsibility of Defendant.

Defendant shall be entitled to

deduct from child support payments a total of S300.00 per year
for all visitation and travel expenses.

If Plaintiff delivers

the children to Brigham City and picks up the children from
Brigham City for any visitation, Defendant shall be entitled
to deduct only $200.00 for total travel expenses rather than
$300. 00.

Defendant shall continue to be allowed to reduce

child support obligations by 3400.00 during summer visitation.
12.

There shall be no other changes in child support

paid by Defendant except as ordered for travel expenses.
13.

All repeated conflict and emotional distress and

strain shall be discontinued by the parties.
14.

No police officers or other individuals shall

intervene or otherwise be used to force compliance with this
order.

Washington Social Services or such other qualified

agency shall be allowed to assist in compelling compliance of
the Court order if deemed reasonably necessary by such agency
after a proper review.

The Court will allow reasonable

exclusions from visitation for illness if any such child is
isolated because of said illness or upon a doctor's
certification.

5

-A25-

-^4o

15.

Defendant shall continue to be responsible for and

maintain health insurance coverage for the children.

If

Plaintiff desires to obtain medical insurance and provide
insurance and health care coverage, Plaintiff is allowed to
provide the same at her own expense.

If Plaintiff so elects,

she shall inform the Defendant thereof in writing and
Defendant shall thereafter be relieved of further duty and
obligation to provide health insurance or medical coverage.
IS.

Neither of the parties shall be allowed to recover

for costs and expenses in this action, whether travel,
medical, legal or otherwise, and each party shall bear his or
her own costs and expenses incurred in this action and prior
hereto.
17.

All other requests and motions of Defendant except

as herein specifically provided shall be and are hereby
denied.
20.

All other orders of the Court as previously

entered

and not modified by this order shall stand as otherwise
provided.

3Y THE COURT

Confirmed copies mailed this dare
:o Stephen W # Jewell and Mark
3. Weiner by:

>/7^W
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7/V^^A.

Cmer J. Cali^
District Judge
6

MaryyC. Holmgren-Deputy
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNT!
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN RAWLINGSf

)

Petitioner, )
NO. 85-3-04844-3
v..
ORDER DECLINING
JURISDICTION

MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
Respondent. )

Petitioner's motion for determination of jurisdiction and
communication with Box Elder County District Court having duly
and regularly come on for hearing, the same being referred to
the undersigned commissioner who had presided over contemporane
ous Juvenile Court proceedings concerning the custody of the
children subject of this proceeding and retained jurisdiction
therein; the court having further communicated with the appropr
ate judge of Bex Elder County District Court; now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this court
finds that the custody and visitation of the children subject t
this proceeding has also been subject to the subject matter
jurisdiction of the 3ox Elder County District Court of the Stat
of Utah; that said court acquired jurisdiction over the parries
and the subject matter several years ago and has continuously,-,
exercised jurisdiction in enforcement and modification proceedings; and that one of the named parties, father ofAHhechiadrei

ORDER - 1
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continues to reside in the State of Utah; that upon communication with said court it has elected and determined to continue
exercising sole and exclusive child custody jurisdiction; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (RCW 26.27) it is determined that Box
Elder County District Court of the State of Utah continues to
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and
visitation of the parties1 children, the parties not having
agreed to litigate exclusively in the State of Washington and
there being no emergency justifying intervention in the matter
by Washington Courts; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Washington proceedings concerning the custody of said children are hereby stayed

until

further order of the court or until an appropriate motion for
dismissal proceedings is filed and granted; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the courts of Washington and this
proceeding shall remain open for enforcement provisions of such
orders as have been and may be entered by the Box Elder County
District Court of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of
the UCCJA.

Dated and signed in open this

-^ of January, 1986

STEPHEN M. GADDIS, COURT COMMISSIONER

ORDER - 2
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78-45c~l.

Purposes - Construction.

(1) The general purposes of this act are to:
(a) Avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict with
courts of other states in matters of child custody which have
in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state
to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(b) Promote cooperation with the courts of other states
to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state
which can best decide the case in the interest of the child;
(c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a
child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child
and his family have the closest connection and where
significant evidence concerning his care, protection,
training, and personal relationships is most readily
available, and that court of this state decline the exercise
of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer
connection with another state;
(d) Discourage continuing controversies over child
custody in the interest of greater stability of home
environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
(e) Deter abductions and other unilateral removals of
children undertaken to obtain custody awards;
(f) Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other
states in this state insofar as feasible;
(g) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of
other states;
(h) Promote and expand the exchange of information and
other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this
state and those of other states concerned with the same
child; and
(i) To make uniform the law of those states which enact
it.
(2) This title shall be construed to promote the general
purposes stated in this section.
78-45c-2.

Definitions.

As used in this act:
(1) "Contestant" means a person, including a parent,
who
claims a right to custody or visitation rights with respect
to a child;
(2) "Custody determination" means a court decision and
court orders and instructions providing for the custody of a
child, including visitation rights; it does not include a
decision relating to child support or any other monetary

obligation of any person;
(3) "Custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which
a custody determination is one of several issues, such as an
action for dissolution of marriage, or legal separation and
includes child neglect and dependency proceedings;
(4) "Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody
determination contained in a judicial decree or order made in
a custody proceeding, and includes an initial decree and a
modification decree;
(5) "Home state" means the state in which the child
immediately preceding the time involved lived with his
parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least
six consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than
six months old the state in which the child lived from birth
with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary
absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of
the six-month or other period;
(6) "Initial decree" means the first custody decree
concerning a particular child;
(7) "Modification decree" means a custody decree which
modifies or replaces a prior decree, whether made by the
court which rendered the prior decree or by another court;
(8) "Physical custody" means actual possession and
control of a child;
(9) "Person acting as parent" means a person, other
than a parent, who has physical custody of a child and who
has either been awarded custody by the court or claims a
right to custody; and
(10) "State" means any state, territory or possession of
the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the
District of Columbia.
78-45c-3.

Bases of jurisdiction in this state•

(1) A court of this state which is competent to decide
child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child
custody determination by initial or modification decree if
the conditions as set forth in any of the following
paragraphs are met:
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child at
the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been
the child's home state within six months before commencement
of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state
because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his
custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting
as parent continues to live in this state;

(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a
court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the child
and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant,
have a significant connection with this state, and (ii) there
is available in this state substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships;
(c) The child is physically present in this state and
(i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in
an emergency to protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is
otherwise neglected or dependent; or
(d)(i) It appears that no other state would have
jurisdiction under prerequisites substantial in accordance
with paragraphs (a), (b), or (c), or another state has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody
of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the
child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(2) Except under paragraphs (c) and (d) of subsection
(1)/ physical presence in this state of the child, or of the
child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a child
custody determination.
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desireable, is
not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody.
78-45c-4.

Persons to be notified and heard.

Before making a decree under this act, reasonable notice
and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the
contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been
previously terminated, and any person who has physical
custody of the child. If any of these persons is outside
this state, notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given
pursuant to section 78-45c-5.
78-45c-5. Service of notice outside state - Proof of service
- Submission to jurisdiction.
(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over
a person outside this state shall be given in a manner
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, and may be made
in any of the following ways:
(a) By personal delivery outside this state in the
manner prescribed for service of process within this state;

(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the place in
which the service is made for service of process in that
place in an action in any of its courts of general
jurisdiction;
(c) By any form of mail addressed to the person to be
served and requesting a receipt; or
(d) As directed by the court (including publication, if
other means of notification are ineffective).
(2) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed,
delivered, or last published at least 10 days before any
hearing in this state.
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be made by
affidavit of the individual who made the service, or in the
manner prescribed by the law of this state, the order
pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the
place in which the service is made. If service is made by
mail, proof may be a receipt signed by the addressee or other
evidence of delivery to the addressee.
(4) Notice is not required if a person submits to the
jurisdiction of the court.
78-45c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere- Jurisdiction not
exercised - Inquiry to other state - Information exchange
-Stay of proceeding on notice of another proceeding.
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its
jurisdiction under this act if at the time of filing the
petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was
pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction
substantially in conformity with this act, unless the
proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because
this state is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons.
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding
the court shall examine the pleadings and other information
supplied by the parties under section 78~45c~10 and shall
consult the child custody registry established under section
78-45c-16 concerning the pendency of proceedings with respect
to the child in other states. If the court has reason to
believe that proceedings may be pending in another state it
shall direct an inquiry to the state court administrator or
other appropriate official of the other state.
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the
proceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody of the
child was pending in another state before the court assumed
jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate
with the court in which the other proceeding is pending to
the end that the issue may be litigated in the more

appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in
accordance with sections 78-45c-19 through 78-45c-22. If a
court of this state has made a custody decree before being
informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another state
it shall immediately inform that court of the fact. If the
court is informed that a proceeding was commenced in another
state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise inform
the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated
in the more appropriate forum.
78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient
forum - Factors in determination - Communication with other
court -Awarding costs•
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make
an initial or modification decree may decline to exercise
its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it
finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody
determination under the circumstances of the case and that
a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the
court's own motion or upon motion of a party or a guardian ad
litem or other representative of the child.
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the
court shall consider if it is in the interest of the child
that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it
may take into account the following factors, among others:
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's
home state;
(b) If another state has a closer connection with the
child and his family or with the child and one or more of the
contestants;
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's
present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships is more readily available in another state;
(d) If the parties have agreed on another forum which
is no less appropriate; and
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this
state would contravene any of the purposes stated in section
78-45c-l.
(4) Before determining
jurisdiction the court may
another state and exchange
assumption of jurisdiction
assuring that jurisdiction

whether to decline or retain
communicate with a court of
information pertinent to the
by either court with a view to
will be exercised by the more

appropriate court and that a forum will be available to the
parties.
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum
and that a court of another state is a more appropriate
forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the
proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be
promptly commenced in another named state or upon any other
conditions which may be just and proper, including the
condition that a moving party stipulate his consent and
submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum.
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction
under this act if a custody determination is incidental to an
action for divorce or another proceeding while retaining
jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an
inappropriate forum it may require the party who commenced
the proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs of the
proceedings in this state, necessary travel and other
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by other
parties or their witnesses. Payment is to be made to the
clerk of the court for remittance to the proper party.
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this
section the court shall inform the court found to be the more
appropriate forum of this fact, or if the court which would
have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known,
shall transmit the information to the court administrator or
other appropriate official for forwarding to the appropriate
court.
(9) Any communication received from another state
informing this state of a finding of inconvenient forum
because a court of this state is the more appropriate forum
shall be filed in the custody registry of the appropriate
court. Upon assuming jurisdiction the court of this state
shall inform the original court of this fact.
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care
of parties and children - Court to have continuing
jurisdiction -Custody and visitation - Termination of
alimony -Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children,
property, and parties. The court shall include the following
in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment
of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
the dependent children; and

(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an
order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate
health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependant
children.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all
or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent. If the court determines
that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent
children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the non-custodial parent to provide the day
care for the dependent children, necessitated by the
employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and
their support, maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental
care, or the distribution of the property as is reasonable
and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall consider
the welfare of the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to
a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage
of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony
shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to
the action of annulment and his rights are terminated.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party
paying alimony that the former spouse is residing with a
person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further
established by the person receiving alimony that that
relationship or association is without any sexual contact,
payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or
visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied,
the court may order the petitioner to pay the reasonable
attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that
action, if the court determines that the petition was without
merit and not asserted in good faith.

